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Abstract 
Animal research is a challenging issue for the animal advocate because of what, 
besides animal well-being, is considered to be at stake, namely, human health. This 
article seeks to vindicate the antivivisectionist position. The standard defense of 
animal research as promoting the overwhelming good of human health is refuted 
on both factual and logical, or normative-theoretical, grounds. The author then 
attempts to clinch the case by arguing that animal research violates a deontic 
principle. However, this principle falls to counterexample. The author concludes, 
nevertheless, that the principle retains force as a presumption that the current state
of affairs fails to overthrow. This does suggest, though, that the antivivisection 
movement would be well advised to keep ahead of the curve. The author proposes it
do so by emulating the vegan movement against animal agriculture with the active 
promotion of alternatives to animal research. 
Introduction 
Some people, such as myself, have a strong intuition that animal 
research is wrong. By “animal research” I refer to the use of 
nonhuman animals in laboratory experimentation that involves, 
typically, causing them distress, pain, or mutilation, housing them in 
cages, and, finally, killing them. Put this way, it may seem surprising 
that it should be difficult to prove the soundness of the intuition. But 
animal research is an exceptionally challenging issue for animal 
advocates, and for two reasons. 
First is that the number of animals used in laboratories, while in 
the millions, is still vanishingly small compared, say, to how many are 
raised and slaughtered for human food. As another article puts it: 
“From a statistician’s point of view … all animals [with whom humans
interact in the United States] are farmed animals; the number that 
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are not is statistically insignificant” (Wolfson and Sullivan 2004, 
206) .1 Why then make an issue of animal research, especially if one 
is concerned about animals? Shouldn’t the animal movement focus 
its attention and resources where they could do the most good? 
The second cause for pause is that opposition to animal research,
particularly of the medical variety, seems to be up against matters of 
life and death for human beings. The use of animals for food is much 
easier to attack because human beings do not need to eat animals in 
order to survive or even to thrive.2 But that animal research has made
the difference between sickness and health, debility and capability, 
pain and relief, untimely demise and longevity, including for other 
animals who are treated by veterinarians, seems beyond question. As 
a prominent animal-rights proponent has put it, “The argument that 
it is necessary to use nonhumans in biomedical research, though 
flawed, is at least plausible, unlike our necessity arguments for other 
animal uses” (Francione 2007, 241). 
Against this formidable challenge, and indeed precisely because 
of it, understanding what is wrong with animal research could be the 
key to understanding what is wrong with the use of animals in 
general. For if it can be convincingly demonstrated that even a 
minimal number of animals ought not to be used even when human 
existence would be significantly benefited thereby, as in medical 
experimentation and toxicological testing, then the case will surely 
have been made for also refraining from all of their other, more
widespread yet trivial uses, such as palate-pleasing, clothing, sport,
and entertainment. In this essay I will therefore undertake to refute 
the best argument the research defender has to offer, and also 
propose my own argument against animal research. Alas, my efforts 
will meet with only tentative theoretical success; but that will be 
sufficient to suggest a compensating practical program of animal 
advocacy. 
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The Best Defense of Animal Research, and Its 
Refutation 
The best defense of animal research is that it promotes the
welfare of humanity. But this very defense would seem to present a 
moral paradox. For presumably other animals are used in this work 
because of their similarities to human beings: how else to obtain 
results that are relevant to our primary concern with human health? 
On the other hand, this use of animals fails to accord them any moral 
status even approaching our own. But if other animals are so similar 
to us, then why don’t they deserve similar moral consideration?3 
The defender of animal research claims to be able to defang this 
objection. To begin with, she maintains, the animals do receive due 
consideration. In recent years animals in labs have increasingly been
accorded humane treatment. But, I reply, there remain gaping 
loopholes. The most obvious is that the only federal legislation 
protecting animals in laboratories (in America), the Animal Welfare 
Act, explicitly excludes upwards of 90 percent of those animals by the
simple expedient of excluding rodents, among others, from the 
definition of “animal” (Plous 1999). But even though other guidelines 
and protections are in place, the main problem is with the very 
meaning of “humane” and related terminology. In animal research
one enters an Orwellian world where cruelty is humane, exploitation 
is sacrifice, and killing is welfare, or so I will argue below in the 
section on rhetoric. 
A second and more forceful rebuttal by the research defender, 
however, is that, humane or inhumane, and animal/human 
similarities notwithstanding, animal research is justified by the 
greater good it generates. By sacrificing a relatively small number of 
animals now, medical science lays the groundwork for alleviating 
pain, impairment, and premature death for untold millions of human
beings into the indefinite future. This is surely the central argument 
in support of animal research. But it can be refuted, and by both of 
the standard, rational ways of doing so, namely, denying the truth of 
the premise and the validity of the inference. 
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The premise of the argument is that animal research has a 
significant payoff in alleviating human misery. But this claim has 
been challenged by a number of researchers on empirical grounds; 
the evidence may be simply lacking (Pound et al. 2004). Yet even if it 
were shown that animal research has in fact led to the claimed result, 
it would not follow logically that the research is justified. There are 
two distinct reasons for saying this. Both are based on the utilitarian 
presumption of the argument supporting animal research. 
Utilitarianism is the moral thesis that the end justifies the 
means. Thus, the argument we are now criticizing has claimed, in 
effect, that the end of human welfare justifies the use of nonhuman 
animals in the laboratory as means to that end, even if the welfare of 
those animals is compromised in the process. And, we are now 
granting for the sake of argument, human welfare has been furthered 
in just this way. 
The first objection to this argumentative employment of 
utilitarianism is that it distorts the meaning of utilitarianism. For 
utilitarianism does not mandate that any practice that produces
some good, even significant good, is justified, but only that a practice 
that produces the most good (or the least bad) should be done. After 
all, if we were using our national health budget to alleviate the 
suffering of one million people, that would be a good; but if we could 
alleviate the same suffering of ten million people by using alternative 
strategies but the identical budget, then, all other things equal, that 
change would not only be better, but, it seems plausible to maintain, 
obligatory. 
So the real question in the present case is: Has animal research 
shown itself to be more effective than any alternative sort of research 
that might have been done all these years in its stead? And even if it 
has, the more relevant question to the present day is to ask: Is there 
good reason to believe that continuing to invest in the animal 
infrastructure of research would be more conducive to medical 
progress from here on than would investing equivalent resources in 
any alternative methodologies? The answers to these questions are 
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far from obvious, and indeed a compelling case can be made that the 
answer to both is No (Bass Forthcoming). Consider, for example, that 
a medical science that is premised on animal research contains, as 
“costs,” both false negatives, such as drugs that proved harmless in 
other animals but turned out to be harmful to humans, and false 
positives, such as potentially useful drugs for humans that were never 
developed because they proved harmful to other animals. It has even 
been suggested that medical research itself should perhaps be 
demoted, since enough is already known to justify shifting major 
resources to the promotion of exercise, relaxation, and proper diet as 
the most effective means to the end of public health.4 
It would be very odd, by the way, were the research proponent to 
argue that a rigorous demonstration of the superior efficacy of using 
animals is not required since it is “obvious.” For science itself is built 
on the premise that one cannot trust in the obvious. And why else 
would those who do basic animal research in particular be devoting 
countless hours (and “sacrificing” countless animals) to ascertain 
such things as whether other animals are conscious, rational, and 
sentient, and can experience pain, suffering, and joy, all of which are 
obvious?5 
The second objection to the utilitarian argument for animal 
research is that it employs utilitarianism in bad faith. For if medical 
researchers were truly utilitarian, would they not be using human 
beings for much of the research for which they currently use other 
animals? After all, however similar other animals may be to human 
beings, human beings are even more similar because they are 
identical. So clearly human beings would serve as superior models of 
human disease, etc. But of course we  would never use them in this 
way. More precisely, since some researchers have in fact done just 
that, for example, in Nazi concentration camps and in the Tuskegee 
syphilis experiment, such use is today universally deplored. 
If one grants that the utilitarian basis for animal research has 
thus been discredited, then one is left with no moral defense of 
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animal research at all, or else only the cynical one that, as theologian 
Andrew Linzey is wont to put it (while of course rejecting it), “might 
is right” (Linzey 2009). The contradiction of our use of these animals 
is left in place, and we use them simply because we can. Human 
beings have achieved almost absolute power over all of the other 
species of the Earth6 and have exercised that power willy-nilly. The 
fact that the medical use of them happens to be the most compelling 
use does not change the fact that we have implicitly performed a kind 
of reversal of a common principle of ethics. For it is generally agreed 
that “ought” implies “can”; that is, we have no obligation to do 
anything that we are incapable of doing. But animal research inverts 
this to “can” implies “ought” (or at least “permissible”) – a pseudo-
principle we would never think to apply in other contexts. Just 
because you might be capable of murdering a forest recluse and 
getting away with it does not mean that you are morally entitled to do
it, not even if you could thereby steal enough money to support your 
starving family. So why is it OK to do the equivalent to a rat in a lab in
a speculative effort to find a cure for your child’s cancer? 
One More Go-around 
There is a more direct defense of animal research, which some 
are willing to offer unabashedly even though others denigrate it as 
“speciesism,” that goes like this. Even absent compelling proof that 
animal research is effective or the most effective way to promote 
human health with our research dollars, we are justified to engage in 
it, absent a clear alternative path, simply because we value other 
animals much less than we value human beings. In this sense the 
“moral cost” of using animals in the lab is easily outweighed by even 
the tenuous hope of advancing human interests. 
I reply to this in two ways. First I question the premise. For while
it is certainly true that human beings commonly behave as if other 
animals had very little value, human beings also often behave to the 
contrary. Pets are the most obvious example, at least if we are talking 
about the 21st Century United States. It is a commonplace for some 
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sort of nonhuman animal to be considered a member of the family in 
this country (Petside Team, 2009). Furthermore, many, perhaps 
most of the people who work with animals in laboratories consider 
themselves to be animal-lovers and are conscientiously concerned to 
take the best care they can of those animals consistent with the 
research being undertaken. 
So rather than say that human beings de-value other animals, I 
would say that human beings value them inconsistently. A person 
who cries over her beloved puppy’s wounded paw could also relish 
eating the leg of a lamb that had been subjected to a cruel life and 
death. If you have ever entered your child’s bedroom in your
tenement apartment at night, only to discover a giant rat perched 
atop him, you might at once commit yourself to the total extinction of
the rodent species. But if you have spent many an hour looking into 
the wise pink eyes of your pet rat, or watching her swinging carefree 
on a makeshift hammock, or feeling her little paws tickling you as she
scurries under your shirt, you might find the thought of her 
compatriots being dissected and beheaded in laboratories 
unbearable. What this tells me is that it is simply not true that we do 
not value other animals highly -- a fortiori, that we are convinced 
they do not possess such value intrinsically. At “best” it could be said 
that we allow our feelings towards other animals to be radically 
skewed by our preferences and by the circumstances. 
But this is surely just as true of other human beings, is it not? 
The most horrific laboratory experiments on other animals are easily 
paralleled by the atrocities that human beings commit on one another
in large numbers. But from this, would it be valid to conclude that 
human beings do not value human beings, not to mention, that 
human beings do not possess high value intrinsically? Not at all. Then
neither can we conclude that other animals lack high intrinsic worth, 
and we have much evidence that we do not conclude thus. 
Let us suppose, however, that it were true that human beings do
not value other animals highly or even that, as a matter of 
metaphysico-ethical fact, animals have negligible inherent value. This
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brings me to my second criticism of the argument, which is that the 
conclusion still would not follow. For suppose other animals were
intrinsically worthless: their use would still not be “cheap” because of 
the vast human and technological infrastructure required to conduct 
research on them. And, reverting to the earlier argument that no clear
proof of the superior efficacy of animal research is available, would it 
not make sense to be redirecting our health-promotion dollars to 
other practices that have been proven or are likely to be more
efficacious? Letting doctors play tiddlywinks all day would not hurt 
anyone, but we would hardly consider this to be the best use of our 
healthcare dollars. 
Interlude on Rhetoric and Research 
Before I present my argument against animal research, I would 
like to discuss briefly the use of misleading rhetoric by defenders of 
animal research. Consider, for example, the term “sacrifice,” as in, 
“The animals are sacrificed for the sake of medical progress.”7 In
itself the idea of sacrifice seems noble. Granted also, the notion of 
“animal sacrifice” is an ancient one. But, just as with the human
“sacrifice” of yore, there is something distinctly jarring to the modern 
ear about “sacrificing” another for one’s own gain, and without their 
consent to boot. 
Any nobility of sacrifice would seem to attach to one’s doing so 
voluntarily for the sake of others. In a less noble but still acceptable 
sense, sacrifice can be made on one’s own behalf, as when one forgoes 
rich desserts in order to lose weight. But to sacrifice another for one’s 
own benefit seems a stretch, indeed a reversal, of the term’s 
legitimate connotations. One would have thought, for example, that 
the paradigmatic religious image in the West of Jesus’s voluntarily
replacing the literal lamb of sacrifice on fallen humanity’s behalf, as 
opposed to a literal ram being conscripted to replace Isaac on 
Abraham’s altar, settled this matter in the most conspicuous terms. 
The animals in the lab are not making a sacrifice. Significant 
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numbers of them are being confined, stressed, tortured, mutilated, 
and killed. 
Another term commonly employed by animal researchers is 
“welfare,” and this often in concert with “humane.” But, as with 
“sacrifice,” everything depends on how these terms are defined.8 For 
example, a schema dubbed “the five freedoms” has established itself 
as a touchstone of animal welfare in animal farming (Farm Animal 
Welfare Council 2009) and has also been applied to laboratory 
research.9  Yet it conveniently omits, for example, the freedom to live 
out one’s natural lifespan.10 This schema therefore seems arbitrary 
from an ethical standpoint and obviously subserving of strictly 
human interests. 
Another example of tendentious narrowing of “welfare” is to 
deem as “humane” any treatment of the animals that spares them 
from unnecessary pain, including routinely killing them. But this is 
doubly disingenuous. First is that pain, by which is usually meant 
physical pain, is surely only one sort of distress that an animal may 
undergo in conditions of lifelong confinement and manipulation
(Brown 2006). Second is that it relies on a notion of “necessary” that 
is itself suspect, this being the final example of research rhetoric I will
discuss. 
Necessity can seem like an absolute notion, but it is actually a 
relative one; necessity is always for some purpose. (As in the ‘60s we 
used to say something was “relevant” … but relevant to what?) Thus, 
to say something is “necessary” as such is either to have a hidden 
agenda or else to try to put something outside the realm of discussion
or questioning. (In the latter respect it functions much like the word 
“sacred.”) 
In the case just introduced, the “welfare” or “humane” restriction
to avoid “unnecessary pain” is meaningless, or at least does not mean 
what it might appear to mean, because, in this context “necessary” is 
understood as relative to research. Sometimes this is stated explicitly;
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for example, the following is a suggested guideline for investigating 
pain in experimental animals: “In studies of acute or chronic pain in 
animals measures should be taken to provide a reasonable assurance 
that the animal is exposed to the minimal pain necessary for the 
purposes of the experiment” (Zimmerman 1983; my emphasis). The 
practical upshot is that none of the “welfare” guidelines, narrow to 
begin with, is absolute; and in fact they are frequently honored in the 
breach, not only illegally but also legally. Therefore, no procedure 
whatever, no matter how painful, lethal, or cruel, is ruled out by this 
interpretation of animal welfare and humane treatment.
 More generally when researchers speak of the necessity of 
animal use, what they have in mind, presumably, is human welfare 
and thriving. So suppose the utilitarian claim were correct that 
animal research would lead to the best outcome for human beings 
and, ultimately, the best outcome for all sentient beings in terms of 
sheer numbers. Then to say that animal research is necessary would 
be to say that, without it, we could not achieve this desirable result. 
But what follows from that morally? Would it mean that animal 
research had thereby been shown to be justified, permissible, indeed, 
obligatory, in other words, not only not wrong, but “the right thing to 
do”? 
Here is what I find to be the most compelling reason for thinking
that the answer is No. 
The Moral Argument against Animal Research: A 
Distinction in Ethics 
I begin my noting that we do countenance the willful harming 
and even killing of another humanbeing under certain circumstances.
Perhaps these can be summed up roughly as: “whenever somebody 
commits or threatens significant harm to us or to another human 
being who is herself harmless.” I note further that the harm that 
justifies harm could even be inadvertent, for example, when a SWAT 
team has to take out the poor guy across the street, who has been 
deceived by terrorists into believing that the button he is about to 
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push will only set off harmless fireworks when in fact it will trigger a 
huge bomb in the marketplace. 
However, I am not aware that we condone the harming or killing
of human beings simply in order to avert a bad or bring about a 
good. Thus, even if the organs from your healthy body could save the 
lives of five other people, it would never be considered ethical or 
moral to “farm” you for that purpose. The “missing link” is that, in 
the normal runs of cases, you are not in any way, either intentionally 
or unintentionally, responsible for the unfortunate condition of those 
five other humans. So we draw this ethical distinction: Harming and 
even killing a human being can sometimes be justified in order to 
reduce or eliminate something bad, but only in those cases where the 
victim has been, is, or could plausibly be instrumental (however 
11inadvertently) in causing that bad. 
Furthermore, we recognize this distinction with other animals. 
For example, it is one thing to kill a dog who is rabid, who has 
harmed or threatens to harm or kill another pet or person. It is quite 
another thing to kill a non-rabid dog in order to “farm” his organs to 
save the lives of five other pets. I think we would consider the latter 
wrong for the same reason as in the human case: There is no 
universal allowance to harm or kill an animal (human or otherwise) 
in order to better the lot of others, but only if that animal is somehow 
instrumental to the harming or killing of those others. 
Just so I would argue: It is not enough to note that the “cost” of 
harming and killing animals in medical research can be “outweighed”
by the benefit of promoting human health and welfare, or even that of 
other animals. It must also be shown that the individual animals 
being harmed or killed were somehow instrumental to the damage 
that this research seeks to ameliorate, or are somehow threatening to 
cause it, however inadvertently. But all lab animals are harmless in 
these respects: they are both innocent and innocuous. Therefore the 
burden of proof is on the animal researcher to explain why it is 
permissible to violate an apparently universal prohibition, in the case
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of animals,12 even nonhuman primates,13 who just happen not to be 
pets.14 
But we have seen that the animal researcher has no proof (other 
than the cynical argument that “might is right”). Therefore etc. 
Q.E.D. 
Conclusion (thus far): Two Rights Do Not Make a Right 
Today’s animal researchers believe that their work is justified in 
two respects, both as to ends and means – a win-win. For their goals 
are noble -- curing or preventing diseases in humans and other 
animals and finding ways to relieve suffering and prolong lives – and 
their methods are humane – making sure that animal use and animal
suffering are minimized. I have argued, however, that this argument 
does not work for the following reasons. One is that the claimed 
humaneness of this sort of research is built on a rhetorical house of 
cards. Another is that the implied utility of animal research -- that is, 
its superior utility to alternative strategies of health-promotion that 
do not involve the experimental use of other animals -- is only 
presumed and has never been proved, and indeed is dubitable. A 
third reason is that any appeal to utility is bogus to begin with, since 
it would dictate the use of human experimental subjects instead of
other animals, but we would not condone that. Fourth is that, when 
sufficiently knowledgeable and mindful of other animals and how 
they are treated in animal research, we do in fact value them
sufficiently highly to resist their use in that way. Finally, even if there 
were convincing evidence of its optimal utility, animal research would
not be justified because it violates a basic rule of morality against 
intentionally harming those who are both innocent and innocuous. 
Burden of Proof 
Strictly speaking that last argument was dialectical overkill. 
There was no need for me to offer a positive proof of the immorality 
of animal research if I had already refuted the researcher’s best 
argument for its permissibility -- that is, given the presumption that 
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the confinement, harming, and killing of animals does require some
justification. I felt impelled to go the extra mile, though, for two 
reasons. My refutation relied on an empirical claim, namely, that the 
superior efficacy of animal research has not been convincingly 
demonstrated; but future research (on the efficacy of animal 
research), as well as the growing sophistication of animal research 
itself, could put the lie to that claim. So I wanted to do an end run
around that possibility. Secondly, I wanted to understand the 
intuition that makes me care so much about this issue. For it’s not 
just that animal research may be “suboptimal”: It also generates 
outrage. I therefore wanted to discover and articulate the principle 
that explained this deep feeling within me. 
Alas, my argument for the principle does not work. It is easy 
enough to think of a counterexample to it. I recall a striking one from 
the 1972 Swedish film The New Land (Nybyggarna), which is about 
the hardships of the pioneering Swedish settlers in Minnesota. In one
scene the character played by Max von Sydow is caught in a blizzard 
with his little son on the way home from purchasing their pride-and­
joy ox. The son is about to freeze to death. There is only one thing to 
do: Sydow takes an ax to the ox and carves out its steaming guts to 
provide a warm shelter for the little boy, thereby saving his life. 
This powerful scene (I wonder how it was filmed!) has left such 
an impression after all these years. Interestingly I cannot recall 
having felt one iota of pity for the ox, not to mention moral outrage, 
this being from my pre-animal-consciousness days. I do remember 
how heart-wrenching it was to contemplate the loss of the human 
family’s hard-won economic mainstay, namely, the ox. (Here we can 
truly speak of the sacrifice of an animal in the sense of being a 
sacrifice made by the family of its own valued property.) The sheer
violence and novelty of the scene probably round out the explanation 
of its vividness in my memory. But in no way is there a moment’s 
hesitation, now as then, regarding the aptness of the act on moral 
grounds. Indeed, the possibility of saving the boy in this way having 
occurred to one, it might seem just to condemn as immoral the 
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failure to perform it. But the act is a clear violation of the principle I 
have put forward that one is not entitled to significantly harm a being 
who has not harmed or does not threaten harm to oneself or another 
who is harmless. For the ox had no role whatever in the harm being 
threatened to the boy; yet it seems meet to kill the ox to save the 
boy.15 
How then stands the case of animal research? Is there a 
stalemate, since both the argument for and the argument against 
animal research have been refuted? I think not. For the burden of 
proof lay on the former. Why? Because of two considerations already 
adduced. First, animal research has a cost over and above any harm 
to the animals – what are called opportunity costs, which is to say, 
the missed opportunity of alternative uses of our healthcare dollars, 
which could prove more effective in advancing human health in the 
short and/or long term. But second, and more compelling, since the 
first is largely speculative: animal research involves cruelty to and 
killing of sentient beings who are innocent and innocuous. While this 
second fact by itself does not prove that animal research is morally 
wrong, it is surely sufficient to establish the need to prove that it is 
morally permissible if it is to be undertaken. 
But the animal research proponent has failed to show that. Even 
if she is deeply moved by, say, the suffering of children in need of a 
medical cure, her intuition that animal research must be pursued full 
speed ahead hardly follows logically or morally if there is no proof 
that such research promises such a cure, not to mention, by the first 
consideration, might be diverting precious resources from finding it 
more efficaciously, or preventing the maladies in the first place. 
Therefore animal research, even in the absence of a definitive proof of 
its wrongness, is no more justified than killing your first-born to 
propitiate the gods, even though it may be impossible to prove that 
those bloodthirsty deities do not exist. 
Let me put it in another way: The principle I have articulated is 
not a proof but a presumption, yet that is sufficient to demonstrate 
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the impermissibility of animal research. The reason is that a 
presumption holds ceteris paribus, or “other things equal.” In the 
example of the ox, other things were not “equal”: by killing the ox, the
little boy’s life could probably be saved, which is enough to tip our 
considered intuitions in favor of the act. But in the case of most 
animal research, or perhaps all of animal research taken as an 
institution, there is insufficient evidence to overthrow the 
presumption that it is wrong to treat animals in these ways.16 Simply 
put: one needs a good reason to harm an animal, and the reason that 
experimenting on animals “might” help us find cures for terrible 
diseases, etc., is not good enough. This kind of “might” is as unlikely 
as the other to “make right.” Too much suffering, not to mention 
expense, would be sanctioned for too little “payoff”; and indeed, as 
argued earlier, the goal of maximal human well-being could even be 
offset thereby. 
Thus, while the presumption of the principle I have proposed 
does not provide absolute protection for animals, it may be the best 
that ethics has to offer.17 Yet, this could be sufficient for a vibrant 
antivivisection movement. A definite practical program is suggested 
by the theoretical state of affairs. First, since a strong case can be 
made that animal research is currently unjustified on the grounds of 
inefficacy or unproven maximal efficacy, as argued in the first part of 
this essay, those of us who advocate for animals will want to educate 
both the medical profession and the public (not to mention, 
ourselves!) about this. But since the medical community will in the 
meantime be striving to improve both the efficacy of animal research 
and the evidence of that efficacy, a further initiative by the animal 
protection community is likewise in order, namely, the active 
promotion of alternatives to animal research in the furtherance of 
human health. 
What I am suggesting is analogous to the role veganism has 
come to play in the opposition to animal agriculture. Many animal 
advocates18 argue that the most effective strategy to end the 
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exploitation of animals for human food is simply to get everybody to 
stop eating any animal products.19 But for this to become a mass 
movement, the public needs to be educated about edible alternatives. 
So it is not enough to harp on the atrocities of factory farming; we 
must also be promoting the joys and ease and benefits of a vegan 
diet.20 Just so, I am proposing that the vanguard of the 
antivivisection movement be, not only the drumbeat of exposés about
the lives and deaths of laboratory animals, but also and perhaps 
especially the funding of research, training, and publicity about 
alternatives to the use of animals in laboratories. Furthermore, this 
would include not only laboratory alternatives, like computer models 
and cell cultures,21 but also, perhaps even primarily, alliances with 
healthy lifestyle campaigns. In sum: The end of animal exploitation is
most likely to come about when human beings stop relying on animal
products to satisfy their appetites and on doctors in order to be
healthy.22 
Notes 
*. My subtitle takes its cue from the classic defense of animal research
by Carl Cohen (Cohen 1986). 
1. This way of putting the point is reminiscent of the humorous 
observation in The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy that, statistically 
speaking, given the teeming multitudes of beings in the galaxy, the 
Earth is uninhabited. This provided an excellent pretext for 
destroying the planet in order to build a hyperspace bypass. 
2. “It is the position of the American Dietetic Association that 
appropriately planned vegetarian diets, including total vegetarian or 
vegan diets, are healthful, nutritionally adequate, and may provide 
health benefits in the prevention and treatment of certain 
diseases” (American Dietetic Association 2009). 
3. An excellent discussion of contradiction as characterizing our 
whole use of other animals can be found in Satz 2009. 
4. This is a constant theme of Dr. David L. Katz in his syndicated 
health columns; e.g., “From a preventionist’s perspective, the lesser 
shame is our failure, to date, to wrest much new knowledge of 
practical value from our genome. By far, the greater shame … is our 
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failure to use the knowledge we already have [about] the 
overwhelming influence of lifestyle on health” (Katz 2010). 
5. An interesting discussion of scientific skepticism about animal 
minds can be found in Allen and Bekoff 2007. 
6. I credit Wayne Pacelle for bringing me to this realization. 
7. A typical instance: Yale Prof. Marina Picciotto is quoted as saying, 
"I fundamentally believe that relieving human suffering or disease of 
children is worth the sacrifice of mouse lives" (Distler 2009). 
8. Larry Carbone stresses this point throughout his book (Carbone 
2004). 
9. A critical assessment of this application can be found in Behnam 
Manesh 2010. 
10. Not to mention that the standards are not even intended to be 
followed! From the previously cited Website: “We believe that an 
animal's welfare, whether on farm, in transit, at market or at a place 
of slaughter should be considered in terms of 'five freedoms'. These 
freedoms define ideal states rather than standards for acceptable 
welfare.” 
11. One caveat is the doctrine of double effect, according to which 
“sometimes it is permissible to bring about as a merely foreseen side 
effect a harmful event that it would be impermissible to bring about 
intentionally” (McIntyre 2009). Thus, in wartime it is not 
automatically considered wrong to drop a bomb on an enemy 
munitions factory even though it may inevitably injure or kill 
neighborhood residents who are innocent and innocuous. The point 
is: If one could take out the factory without harming the civilians, one
would gladly do so. 
12. Note that the doctrine of double effect does not save the day for 
animal research since, in many cases, one directly intends harm to 
the animals. How else, for example, to test an analgesic? 
13. A review of the use of nonhuman primates in medical research, by 
the Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust (both in the 
UK), can be found at 
http://www.mrc.ac.uk/Utilities/Documentrecord/index.htm? 
d=MRC002558 (accessed May 29, 2010). 
14. Not to mention that some lab animals have been or could be pets, 
e.g., dogs. Research animal use statistics compiled by the U.S. 
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Department of Agriculture can be found here: 
http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/ARI/awreport2006-1.pdf 
(accessed May 29, 2010). (Conspicuously absent, because not covered
by the Animal Welfare Act, are rats and mice.) 
15. There is of course a far more obvious (apparent) counterexample 
to the principle, namely, our use of other animals as food. However, I 
discounted this from the outset as not capable of withstanding
sustained moral scrutiny since, I cannot help but feel, most people, or
at least most of those reading this article, would share my intuition 
that animal husbandry, or certainly factory farming, is 
unconscionable, were they but aware of (1) what really goes on or 
focusing on it, (2) our genuine nutritional needs, and (3) appetizing 
and economical alternatives. But in the ox case, I dare say, there is no
“out.” 
16. Thus my conclusion accords with that of LaFollette and Shanks
1996: 
… the moral onus always rests on anyone who wishes to perpetrate 
what is, all things being equal, a moral wrong. Since people on both 
sides of this debate, researchers included, acknowledge the moral 
status of non-human animals, then they must provide clear and 
demonstrable evidence that the value of the institution of research 
exceeds its moral costs. That they have not done. … it is difficult to 
know how they could. (pp. 260-61) 
17. The presumptive principle may still hold absolute sway with
regard to human beings, as a prerogative we reserve for our own 
species. (This could be a way to understand the exquisite re-analysis 
of the trolley car cases in Thomson 2008.) Thus, my argument
against animal research is compatible with speciesism. At this point I 
therefore wish to make explicit another presumption of my own, 
although not a normative one like the other but a meta-ethical one. I 
view morality as, at base, an expression of our desires. Indeed, I am 
prepared to dispense with moral language altogether as a way of 
cleaning house of any connotation of a universal and objective
prescriptivity (cf. Garner 1994; and my own manuscript tentatively 
titled Bad Faith: A Philosophical Memoir on Atheism, Amorality, 
and Animals). Insofar as I concede speciesism, therefore, it is not as 
an ethical mandate but simply a nod to prevailing views. 
18. See for example Francione 2009 and Hall 2010. 
19. Cf. the refrain from the Vietnam War era: “Suppose they gave a 
war and nobody came?” 
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20. See for example the Website, The Easy Vegan at 
http://www.theeasyvegan.com. 
21. In the forefront of such work is the Alternatives Research & 
Development Foundation, headquartered in Jenkintown, 
Pennsylvania, and on the Web at http://www.ardf-online.org/. 
22. This essay owes a great deal to on-going dialogues with Robert 
Bass, Theresa Cunningham, David Katz, Mitchell Silver, Ian Smith, 
Peter Smith, and Wendell Wallach, steadfast assistance from Susan 
Kopp, Sue Leary, Carol Pollard, and David Smith, and the enduring 
inspiration of Gary Francione, Justin Goodman, Lee Hall, Melanie 
Stengel, and Persephone. 
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